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He's trying to do more than formalize his hold over the sections he already had.
There's no reason to go after Kyiv just to secure the separatist republics. There's no reason to attack Ukraine from all sides. He could have easily rolled his army into the separatist areas and simply claimed them formally.
The reality is that Putin was probably prepared to do number of things.
-Depose the current Ukraine government and replace it with a puppet state (I think this was his best-case scenario).
-Split Ukraine down the middle at the Dnieper river. This would secure a huge buffer zone, allow him to place puppet governments, and would fully secure his hold on Crimea (this was probably what he realistically expected). One of the things that makes Crimea expensive for Russia to hold is that Crimea's water is dependent on a canal from the Dnieper that Ukraine has controlled since the annexation. Ukraine dammed this canal, cutting off fresh water from Ukraine and costing Russia billions to move water in, on top of all the other costs of maintaining Crimea.
-Secure a coastal route to Crimea which would at least ease logistics and secure Russian control of the Sea of Azov (probably his worst-case scenario).
All of this though I think hinged on Russia being able to topple Ukraine before the west responded. It took nearly a year for sanctions to come down over Crimea by which point prevailing logic was to soften the sanctions because Russia already had Crimea, why antagonize further? Realistically, I doubt Putin had any reason to suspect the west would rally so quickly and put up so many sanctions with this level of unity. Combined with Ukraine resisting far harder than expected and he's basically created a situation where I'm not sure what he can win anymore. Even if he somehow draws back to territory he controls, then what? Ukraine can negotiate a ceasefire that everyone knows Putin won't respect (he's already violated every agreement Russia has ever signed Ukraine, a new one will be no different). The west could keep sanctions in place, eat the blow to their own economies for a few years, and let Russia collapse unless it makes Ukraine whole again.
Whatever he wanted or expected to achieve, I don't see how he gets it anymore. Best case scenario for Russia we default to pre-invasion lines but I don't know that anyone will go along with that and sit to wait for Russia to try again in a few years. Not even his worst case goal is achievable if Ukraine refuses to give in and keeps fighting and the West maintains sanctions in solidarity with them.
I do wonder how much it affects the average Russians if the economy is collapsed relative to the USD though? Russia is less reliant on foreign trade than most western countries, and I imagine capable of having an insular economy. Not that that's a desirable outcome, but I guess the question I'm asking is the Russian economy measured relative to the USD really a good measure of the health of the country internally?
My understanding on this is limited.
Russia's economy isn't good and was flat-lining before COVID-19 hit and knocked it back down. Russia began investing in gold and try to move away from USD after Crimea. That's what a lot of the no-fly zones EU countries are throwing up are about. If he can't sell the gold that makes up about half of the central banks reserve, then its value is effectively zero. It's not clear who he could even sell the gold too and with the no-fly zones even more unclear how he'd move it if he did. Russia is completely dependent on foreign trade for many luxury and technological goods. Most of their industries are dependent on foreign investment and Russia is also heavily invested in foreign economies to shore up its own. Without the bank reserve fund or its foreign holdings, Russia can't prop up the Russian economy so the logic is that by crippling the central bank Russia's economy will crash and the ruble will undergo hyper-inflation.
That's about as far as I understand this though. I'm not an economist.
This message was edited 3 times. Last update was at 2022/02/28 01:35:04
I figure the situation with Crimea before and the fact that the west (indeed the world) is still reeling and recovering (or trying too) from Covid; made the West far swifter to act.
Considering Covid hit every single nation and is still far from over, I figure that whilst it presents an ideal "everyone is weaker/unstable" moment to invade, its also a time where many felt that the big-names in the international scene should be "behaving" themselves. Esp since they've got enough economic problems without the cost of a major war on top.
There's also the repetitive nature of Russia's actions. At some point the west was going to act swifter to this kind of action from Russia. Putin perhaps hoped that a weakened West after Covid would mean that he'd have at least one more go at it before the West would get together and respond swifter.
Perhaps Putin thought that the west pulling out of the Middle East (again) was a sign that not only couldn't they continue to afford those warzones, but that they couldn't continue to afford to conduct war on that scale for at least a few more years from now. So a prime time to strike when the west wouldn't mobilize armed forces against his own. Perhaps overlooking that economic and other sanctions can hit just as hard as a military force in terms of crippling a country.
This message was edited 1 time. Last update was at 2022/02/28 01:44:32
Overread wrote: I figure the situation with Crimea before and the fact that the west (indeed the world) is still reeling and recovering (or trying too) from Covid; made the West far swifter to act.
Honestly, it's probably also on some level the realization that if the world won't rally around Ukraine now then where does it end? Putin can only vaguely point at his nuclear weapons so many times before leaders start realizing that soft responses become tantamount to capitulation. There is no indication that Putin will stop at Ukraine and his speech the week before the invasion began was legitimately some 1937 Munich Rally stuff. His logic that Ukraine is not a country could apply to Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, and the Balkans, all of which become geostrategic targets if he holds Ukraine.
Putin perhaps hoped that a weakened West after Covid would mean that he'd have at least one more go at it before the West would get together and respond swifter.
There's also still the desperation angle.
Russia did not respond to COVID very well. Globally about 300K and change deaths are attributed to COVID-19 in Russia and that's just an estimation. The real number is certainly higher than that. Russia's population is already declining and its economy hitting a plateau. Russia may have calculated that now would be the last real chance to try and secure a strategic hold on Ukraine and gambled that the response would be less quick and less severe than it has become, and that Ukraine would not be so much trouble to take.
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That and also lets not forget China likes to do similar things with their expansion plans. Every time Russia "gets away with it" it gives China more reason to think they can do the same. Standing up to Russia's actions and forming a very powerful global response is also sending a message to China as well.
Overread wrote: That and also lets not forget China likes to do similar things with their expansion plans. Every time Russia "gets away with it" it gives China more reason to think they can do the same. Standing up to Russia's actions and forming a very powerful global response is also sending a message to China as well.
I'm still kind of baffled to China's position. Their relationship to and with Russia has always been kind of murky and addled. They're not exactly cheering Russia on right now. They're not helping the west gang up on them, but they're not really jumping in to help alleviate the situation either. They're actually looking pretty annoyed at how this is unifying the western alliance, and it's also notable that Japan, Australia, and South Korea are all responding to this with their eyes on China and nervousness about what it might mean for them. It's always seemed like China is content to take the long road to its goals and play patiently rather than rushing to the end. Seeing its geopolitical and international rivals come together in any capacity is not what they wanted.
One Belt One Road is also pretty significantly invested in Ukraine and they probably weren't making that investment to see Russia usurp it.
I think there too you're right. If Russia was allowed to simply have Ukraine with no response, it probably would have collapsed the post-World War II international order.
This message was edited 3 times. Last update was at 2022/02/28 02:09:11
China holds a lot of investment overseas and a lot of overseas debt. That leaves them in a powerful position so long as the west/rest of world stands as individual nations or in small groups. China can use their economic position to leverage pressure against individual blocks.
However when there's a united front that leaves China in a weaker position because their whole economy is so heavily built around supplying product to the rest of the world. Shut that down and their economy crumbles insanely fast.
So this united front likely scares them. It's not just a threat to their potential long term plans to expand their territories, but also their potential to exert political and economic pressure on the world. Of course China has deeper pockets than Russia. They can potentially just see their plans taking a delay and waiting out another bunch of years until global unity reduces.
China's position is probably pragmatism.
They like stability, but also want at least one major trading partner that won't sanction them over various purely political topics
I doubt they're happy over Ukraine specifically, but between the happy smiling children celebration at the end of the Olympics and the complete derailment of the western news media, they're relationship with other countries is suddenly on a high note with no more stories about Hong Kong or Uighurs or human rights. (at least not on the front page or the major news segments)
They're also probably looking at their UN Security Council vote as a potential power play. Who's going to offer them more for a yay or nay vote? (With the caveat that going on record either way may bite them in the future).
Cynically, the whole thing is a useful litmus test for China- how quickly everyone jumps and how far they go tells CHina a lot. And that perhaps Russia isn't a reliable ally, and Putin's level of control and military strength may be more paper tigers than a super power trying to re-assert itself.
This message was edited 1 time. Last update was at 2022/02/28 02:30:46
Accidentally published russian propaganda basically confirmed the intent for total regime change in Ukraine and integration into the Russosphere (including possible annexation). This isn't about getting the rest of the Donbas or linking a landbridge to Crimea or Transnistria, etc. Its purely about rebuilding the Soviet Empire.
Overread wrote: That and also lets not forget China likes to do similar things with their expansion plans. Every time Russia "gets away with it" it gives China more reason to think they can do the same. Standing up to Russia's actions and forming a very powerful global response is also sending a message to China as well.
I'm still kind of baffled to China's position. Their relationship to and with Russia has always been kind of murky and addled. They're not exactly cheering Russia on right now. They're not helping the west gang up on them, but they're not really jumping in to help alleviate the situation either. They're actually looking pretty annoyed at how this is unifying the western alliance, and it's also notable that Japan, Australia, and South Korea are all responding to this with their eyes on China and nervousness about what it might mean for them. It's always seemed like China is content to take the long road to its goals and play patiently rather than rushing to the end. Seeing its geopolitical and international rivals come together in any capacity is not what they wanted.
One Belt One Road is also pretty significantly invested in Ukraine and they probably weren't making that investment to see Russia usurp it.
I think there too you're right. If Russia was allowed to simply have Ukraine with no response, it probably would have collapsed the post-World War II international order.
I think it was quid-pro-quo. Russia wanted Ukraine but needed China as a backdoor to circumvent sanctions and do a diplomatic runaround to assist Russia with avoiding UN interference etc (there are procedural ways to block Russias ability to veto action, but it becomes a lot harder if you're trying to block both Russia and China). In exchange I think the expectation was that Russia would do the same for Chian vis-a-vis Taiwan - the assumption that the Russian bear was strong and deadly would make for a good deterrent to force certain US/Taiwan allies from getting involved in a defense, or potentially even threaten the US directly from taking action, while also being able to hold the threat of cutting energy exports to Europe over the heads of NATO and the EU to prevent them from taking military action or sanctioning China, etc. etc. etc.
I think when it became apparent that the russian bear was old, sick, weak, and had one of its legs caught in a beartrap as it struggled to advance beyond Ukraines borders, China quickly soured on the partnership (hence why their rhetoric went from one of neutrality and non-interference to "we urge Russia to negotiate a settlement" within two days of lead starting to fly) when it became apparent that not only was Russia militarily weak but also the EU was willing to completely sever economic ties with Russia, including energy imports that were assumed to make them compliant and docile in the face of Russian aggression. I think China recognizes that Russia has nothing it can offer it now, and that Russia will only drag China down with it.
I don't think there will be a complete abandonment of Russia on Chinas part, but I think the relationship will shift. I also thing this has probably set back Xis plans for Taiwan a bit, just as a result of the diplomatic fallout - BUT because Chinas military is largely structured and trained along similar lines to Russias, and uses much of the same equipment - or domestic derivatives thereof - I think theres going to be a period of reassessment, restructuring, and reform to further modernize the military and adopt doctrine and policy that are more conducive to waging modern war - Taiwan is better armed, more modernized, and better defensible than Ukraine is, so the Russian failure speaks volumes about what it may encounter trying to cross the Strait.
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CoALabaer wrote: Wargamers hate two things: the state of the game and change.
China already has its own UNSC veto. They don't need Russia's. China and Russia operating in tandem clearly isn't the case too. Russia is trapped in Putin's cold war mentality. China's perspective under Xi seems a bit different. In the backdrop to it all is that despite having many of the same rivals, China and Russia just never seem to be on the same page. I think there's a fairly simple observation that China won't help contain Russia but isn't going to go to lengths to bail them out either. No need for any complex backroom dealings. Much of China's rhetoric in response to the conflict has been pretty consistent with their usual party lines.
For me I find it weird because this is how China and Russia always are, like one foot in each other's doors but begrudgingly. Part of that might be that China doesn't want to compete with a resurgent Russia in central Asia, let alone one making rather sweeping claims about territorial redress.
They waited 20 years before absorbing Hong Kong. Saber rattling aside, I don't see an urgency to seize Taiwan. I think China is content to keep playing the long game, something that isn't made easier by Russia rattling everyone's cages.
This message was edited 2 times. Last update was at 2022/02/28 06:04:21
Waiting for my shill money from Spiral Arm Studios
I think it has more to do with the perspective of the leaders. Russia is entirely driven by the ego of Putin, one dude. While Xi is definitely the big man in China, he's more just the current face of the Party than the sole driving personality behind it. The Party is where the long term goals and plans of China are made so they're a lot more patient.
Then there is the fact to consider that if China attacks Taiwan it WILL mean war with the US. Ukraine at least didn't have a guaranteed risk of direct NATO involvement for Russia. So China taking Taiwan is a much riskier proposition.
Self-proclaimed evil Cat-person. Dues Ex Felines
Cato Sicarius, after force feeding Captain Ventris a copy of the Codex Astartes for having the audacity to play Deathwatch, chokes to death on his own D-baggery after finding Calgar assembling his new Eldar army.
China won't invade Taiwan (he says!) - I think whatever small likelihood existed before, will now almost certainly have faded to zero in light of what is happening in Ukraine.
I'm utterly shamed by my country's response to refugees leaving Ukraine. We have space in our house here and my partner has some extended family in Ukraine. We are ready/willing to help any family that need to come here (and it's quite possible we won't be needed) but, as of the reading I was doing on the subject yesterday, it looks like barriers are being put in our path.
This message was edited 1 time. Last update was at 2022/02/28 09:51:48
Grey Templar wrote: I think it has more to do with the perspective of the leaders. Russia is entirely driven by the ego of Putin, one dude. While Xi is definitely the big man in China, he's more just the current face of the Party than the sole driving personality behind it. The Party is where the long term goals and plans of China are made so they're a lot more patient.
Then there is the fact to consider that if China attacks Taiwan it WILL mean war with the US. Ukraine at least didn't have a guaranteed risk of direct NATO involvement for Russia. So China taking Taiwan is a much riskier proposition.
China kind of demonstrating its mentality this morning; Xi expresses support for the Biden Administration's proposed BBB infrastructure project and suggests partnering it with OBOR. Pretty in line I think with China's mentality, especially after all of this. It is ultimately pretty easy to cut Russia out of the global economy. Most of the world will eat higher costs for the effort but only because its disruptive to the financial system and the energy markets which have second-order effects. The obvious counter to it is to build better economic ties and make it harder for the world to just cut you out of it, but the thing there is that conventional logic says that countries with strong economic ties rarely want to fight each other, so China is playing along with diplomatic and international conventions and building its influence alongside its economy, where Russia has spent most of the last decade spurning conventions and taking body blows to its economy.
Also, while this was a few days ago I guess I want to highlight this moment from Kenya's UN representative who gave a very powerful response to Russia's claims that Ukraine isn't a real country;
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Task and purpose on youtube update 2 (and 1, but why bother) is also interesting and you get to see a citizen sourced map.
Re how well/not well things are going.
Western coverage has followed a 'its doomed' day one slump to 'my god they are doing well' day 3/4 rally. That is more about us than the situation.
Russia's mech columns continue to do about 60km a day which is pretty much the limit of such a move. Their logistic trail can only resupply with their current road moving trucks around 200km from their supply bases unless they can establish new forward dumps they are approaching the limits of their exploitation. However most worthwhile targets are within 200km of the borders.
But amazingly the Ukraine air force is still going partly, Russian conscripts don't seem to have NVGs and the majority of the invasion force hasn't left their start positions. It has been suggested everything from local mutiny's to poor operational readiness to Russia probing Ukraine defence with lower quality troops in a first wave (which is kinda one of their MOs) before committing reserves decisively. Sadly it seems likely that it will get worse for all involved.
Yep russia overestimated it's ability to be alone. "We don't need diplomatic relationships" is what they said. Well do you need trade? Looks pretty bad without it...
Russians mass withdrawing their cash and trying to exchange it to anything but russian currency. With access to fund cut off with sanctions banks can't help much and will run out of cash.
China might be able to help but unlikely to help. They won't sacrifice them and their strategy for bailing russia out of hole it dug for itself.
Wouldn't surprise me if the situation is resolved soon with little "accident" in russian goverment with new leader more willing to negotiate.
For me I find it weird because this is how China and Russia always are, like one foot in each other's doors but begrudgingly. Part of that might be that China doesn't want to compete with a resurgent Russia in central Asia, let alone one making rather sweeping claims about territorial redress.
Russia is the last European empire. It is a European western half ruling an eastern Asian (well more than half). It has massive military forces stationed on the southern border and lives in fear China decides with its billion people that the Asian prt belows to them. Every year their population increases and the Russian eastern part decreases. A programme of giving passings to people from former soviet sections hasn't done much to reverse this trend.
It is also aware of how the situation has changed with Russia now needing China more. Russia still trades soviet and more recent cutting edge research with china but it is running out. Without that it is a political ally and supplier of raw materials - and that is the junior weaker part of any relationship.
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tneva82 wrote: Wouldn't surprise me if the situation is resolved soon with little "accident" in Russian government with new leader more willing to negotiate.
I have heard analysists suggest Putin thought he would go out feet first so at 70 restore the Csars empire (puppet government, annex east) then be bumped off so the sanctions can mostly go and get sainted by church. Immortal legacy.
This message was edited 1 time. Last update was at 2022/02/28 12:30:12
Just as an interesting side note fact - in the recent months my wife was tasked to do a huge media analysis for Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, regarding the overall attitude of western media towards Ukraine and possible vectors and styles of communication that Ukraine should employ. She never imagined, that it will be used in such circumstances and for such reasons, but given how Ukraine utilizes every conclusion of this analysis and every piece of advice, she not only had to do her job well, but more importantly, Ukraine must have had a very good intel of the possibility of this invasion months ago.
The_Real_Chris wrote: It has been suggested everything from local mutiny's to poor operational readiness to Russia probing Ukraine defence with lower quality troops in a first wave (which is kinda one of their MOs) before committing reserves decisively. Sadly it seems likely that it will get worse for all involved.
I can only imagine they didn't expect Ukraine to have the will to fight, or that more of the country would welcome them.
Russia has way more military capacity than Ukraine, but Ukraine still has the most numerous military in Europe, so if they want to fight there's a lot of bodies available (not as much as Russia, but still a significant amount and I believe more than Russia has deployed to the region).
The leaders have agreed to a negotiation, hopefully the outcome is a ceasefire.
This message was edited 1 time. Last update was at 2022/02/28 12:44:17
Also a note of Russian doctrine - the old Soviet style was advance the Division until it was shagged, hopefully having set up a forward logistics base, then drive the next division through it picking up any useful bits and continuing on. Rinse and repeat. No idea how much Russian doctrine has changed, but with 2/3rds still in reserve this could the plan.
As I said, its not so much what Russia offers economically as it is the previously believed ability for Russia to use its energy exports to prevent the EU from acting against itself (and by extension, China) - both militarily and economically. Obviously that is now off the table, but many believed prior to this that the EU/NATO/UK would prioritize heating their homes over maintaining peace in eastern Europe when push came to shove. In return, China is an economic lifeline for Russia when the worlds markets close the door on it. Remember also that Europe relies on China for consumer goods and many raw materials, but Russia controls the energy flow (as well as certain foodstuffs) and Ukraine is a major breadbasket as well as being a major source of certain raw materials. Europe can probably survive the economic impact of sanctioning Chinese imports, but would it be able to do so while also having Russia put the squeeze on them for heat and food too?
China already has its own UNSC veto. They don't need Russia's.
Again, there are various arcane and esoteric procedural moves that can be used to invalidate a veto - its a lot easier to do with one veto than it is with two. Resolution 377 for example allows a 2/3 vote of the General Assembly to override decisions made by the security council under certain circumstances. In Russias case, there is now a movement to delegitimize Russias right to a veto as - unlike China - the veto was never formally/legally transferred from the USSR to the Russian Federation, it was just informally agreed upon. There are also certain actions that can be taken to put pressure on Russia or China to boycott the Security Council (though obviously you can't force them to do so, only put pressure on them to encourage them to make that decision), thereby rendering their vote as an abstention instead of a yes/no (this is ow the UN authorized the police action that became the Korean War). The UN/international politics aren't as straightforward as you make it.
For me I find it weird because this is how China and Russia always are, like one foot in each other's doors but begrudgingly. Part of that might be that China doesn't want to compete with a resurgent Russia in central Asia, let alone one making rather sweeping claims about territorial redress.
IIRC they share the worlds largest land border so its not that weird. They are two powers that don't entirely care for one another and have grandiose ambitions but also recognize the need to cooperate to some extent to get what they want and to prevent competition between them. I think theres closer coordination between the two than you do. Russias interest in Ukraine/Easter Europe and the former soviet 'stans and Chinas interests in Taiwan and Southeast Asia are non-competitive and both work to the detriment of the United States and Europe. The bare minimum effort required for each to provide small degrees of mutual support to the other in achieving their respective gains ensures that the two won't compete with one another directly while being to their mutual benefit in weakening the powers that seek to contain them. They don't have to be true allies, they just need to recognize that the enemy of my enemy is my friend.
In any case, its clear that Russia is not as resurgent as they portrayed themselves, and I think thats going to factor into a cooling or recalibration of their relationship, whether that means China becomes less amicable and cooperative with them in the future or Russia becomes the lesser partner in the relationship remains to be seen - and I think will depend on what happens next, especially with regards to Putin and the Russian govt.
Then there is the fact to consider that if China attacks Taiwan it WILL mean war with the US. Ukraine at least didn't have a guaranteed risk of direct NATO involvement for Russia. So China taking Taiwan is a much riskier proposition.
Again, I think this was a "dry run" to some extent for China v Taiwan. If there wasn't a harsh pushback against action in Ukraine, it would have effectively signalled that Taiwan would stand alone - even if the US got involved it would be unlikely that the rest of the international commuinty would raise a finger to stop China, and without the international comunity at its side the US is significantly less likely to act in a meaningful way (i.e. - China have some sanctions, here taiwan have some stingers).
Then there is the fact to consider that if China attacks Taiwan it WILL mean war with the US. Ukraine at least didn't have a guaranteed risk of direct NATO involvement for Russia. So China taking Taiwan is a much riskier proposition.
Agreed. If there was a near-term plan for such an action on Chinas part, I think this pushed it back by at least a decade or two. Its clear that Taiwan could make this a lot more painful for China than Ukraine is currently making it for Russia.
the thing there is that conventional logic says that countries with strong economic ties rarely want to fight each other
Prior to both world wars (especially world war 1) the European economy was in many ways more tightly integrated than the global economy is with China's at this point - those economic risks were not enough to prevent the outbreak of a conflict.
Russia's mech columns continue to do about 60km a day which is pretty much the limit of such a move.
Thats not exactly accurate. The forces in the south have done about 180km towards Nova Odesa and towards Zaporizhzhia (and even further towards Mariupol), this is true so in that sense those forces are doing about 60km/day. Likewise the forces sweeping across the north towards Nizhny have likewise traveled about 180km. But, the forces advancing on kyiv have managed less than 100km (so about 25km/day, though most of that was on the first two days and since then theyve done about 10km/day).
Forces attacking through Donbas have barely moved for the most part.
Their logistic trail can only resupply with their current road moving trucks around 200km from their supply bases unless they can establish new forward dumps they are approaching the limits of their exploitation. However most worthwhile targets are within 200km of the borders.
Thats the major deficiency they are experiencing, they are highly married to rail networks (which they are struggling to capture outside of the south) as they lack sufficient numbers of trucks to keep their forces supplied. If the anticipated switch to siege warfare comes, it will likely strain their lines of supply further as russian artillery consumes a lot of trucks to keep fed, even moreso under a continuous bombardment.
ut amazingly the Ukraine air force is still going partly, Russian conscripts don't seem to have NVGs and the majority of the invasion force hasn't left their start positions.
Doesn't seem accurate. Latest I have seen over the weekend is that 2/3rds of the russian invasion force has entered Ukraine, so that would imply that yes they have moved the majority of their forces beyond their start positions.
to Russia probing Ukraine defence with lower quality troops in a first wave (which is kinda one of their MOs) before committing reserves decisively
This is *not* one of their MOs. Russia has huge personnel shortage issues (for a number of reasons, including demographic/population decline). They restructured their entire military around that issue over the past 10-15 years. They can't afford to throw conscripts into the meatgrinder (the fact that conscripts cant legally serve outside of Russia makes this a nonstarter doctrinally, though it hasn't stopped Russian officers from forcing conscripts to sign contract under duress just before gak kicked off), nor can they afford to risk large personnel losses. Russias maneuver groups (Battalion Tactical Groups) are structured around artillery and support systems, in order to keep personnel farther from the front line. They use their infantry mostly defensively and their tanks as a breakthrough/flanking unit to get behind the enemy after it has been softened up or pinned in place by the artillery - Russian tanks are not an armored spearhead like they are in the west, by doctrine Russian tanks do not fight other tanks if they can help it. Likewise the first units in have been mostly using the latest Russian equipment (heavily modernized T-72, T-80, T-90 variants, Pantsir and modernized Buks/Tors, BMP-2s, BMD-3s and 4s, etc. amongst the equipment sighted), and the number of VDV and Naval Infantry units Russia has thrown into Ukraine has not been insiginificant - these are amnongst Russias most elite infantry units. Theres nothing to support the idea that they are sending in green troops as bullet sponges, not operationally, not doctrinally. Certainly not logically either for that matter, the propaganda and anger that the stories of scared conscripts illegaly forced into crossing the Ukrainian border is generating in Russia is having a big negative impact on Putin politically (whether it makes a difference or matters remains to be seen).
Also a note of Russian doctrine - the old Soviet style was advance the Division until it was shagged, hopefully having set up a forward logistics base, then drive the next division through it picking up any useful bits and continuing on. Rinse and repeat. No idea how much Russian doctrine has changed, but with 2/3rds still in reserve this could the plan.
You have it backwards, 1/3rd is in reserve, 2/3rds is in ukraine.
This message was edited 1 time. Last update was at 2022/02/28 19:36:17
CoALabaer wrote: Wargamers hate two things: the state of the game and change.
I removed some posts and posts quoting said posts. Warnings have been issued and sorry to say, but I am keeping this topic locked now, as some people can't help their selves and this has veered deep into politics and other things we don't want here.
This message was edited 2 times. Last update was at 2022/02/28 21:26:09
